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  EVERY DAY IS A GOOD DAY FOR A JUDGE TO 
LAY DOWN HIS PROFESSIONAL LIFE FOR 
JUSTICE 
Jack B. Weinstein∗
INTRODUCTION 
 
For the moral judge each day is a good day to live as well as––in the 
words of the Plains Indian warriors––”a good day to die.”1
In a democratic republic such as ours, the role of judges is severely 
circumscribed.  They must apply the constitution and laws as adopted by 
the founders, legislature, and executive––with the interstitial play provided 
by our common law system.  Some discretion to interpret and obtain a 
reasonable result is afforded.  Even in a hierarchical judicial system that 
provides room for review and correction on appeal, any more unstructured 
freedom of judges to ignore or apply rules as their personal predilections 
suggested could lead to a chaotic, arbitrary, and unpredictable system of 
jurisprudence, impossible for citizens to comply with in their real worlds 
because they could not foresee when their conduct was in accord with 
society’s not yet delineated demands.  When judges can cut themselves free 
of the law’s dictates, it is not a foregone conclusion that all will see fairness 
the same way.  Some German judges were Nazis; some post-Brown judges 
were segregationists. 
  That is to say, 
the judge embraces his professional life most fully when he is prepared to 
fight––and be criticized or reversed––in striving for justice. 
So, the conclusion is clear: judges must follow the law to avoid a 
 
∗ Senior United States District Judge, Eastern District of New York.  I am grateful for the 
extensive contributions of my former law clerks, Fred A. Bernstein and Joshua Hill, in the 
preparation of this Article.  A discussion of her own writing and pre-Nazi Austria research 
with Maria L. Marcus, Joseph M. McLaughlin Professor of Law, Fordham University 
School of Law, was particularly useful. 
 1. HOWELL RAINES, FLY FISHING THROUGH THE MIDLIFE CRISIS 204 (1993).  According 
to Raines, “‘It is a good day to die’ was the battle cry of the . . . warrior class of the 
Cheyenne Indians[,] the most feared fighters among the Plains Indians.”  Id.  Haines notes 
that “the cry . . . is not about fatality but about freedom” from unwarranted cautions.  Id. at 
205; cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Stevens Smith (Nov. 13, 1787) (“The tree 
of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants.”). 
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kritarchy2
In this country, the crisis of conscience was reached most clearly in the 
contradiction between, on one side, Calhoun and Chief Justice Taney who 
predicated their views on the assumption that Negroes were inferior to 
whites and, on the other, Lincoln’s and Jefferson’s (in his better self) that 
the Declaration of Independence was decisive in holding that all men are 
created equal.
––except, it is submitted, when that law requires the violation of 
the essence of mankind’s sense of justice.  The incongruity between the law 
and demands of a core right (call it natural justice if you will) must be 
absolutely clear if a judge is to rely on this fall-back duty to the heart of 
fairness. 
3  A subsidiary aspect of that great battle over “race,” which 
dominates our history, was resolved fifty years ago when Brown v. Board 
of Education4 overruled Plessy v. Ferguson.5  The reverberations of that 
Brown struggle are still being played out.6
The judge must decide: does this law violate the essence of my duty to 
self and humanity.  The process is gut wrenching.  To society it is often 
confounding.  The battle against fundamental injustice is now being waged 
in trial courtrooms in the confrontation between Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines
 
7
 
 2. James Vescovi & Rebecca Thomas, Columbia Commemorates the 50th Anniversary 
of Brown v. Board of Education, COLUM. L. SCHOOL REP., Summer 2004, at 14, 20. 
 designed to punish by those afar without understanding the 
The last holdout [to Brown] was Justice Reed.  Appointed to the court by 
President Roosevelt in 1938, he regarded desegregation as a problem the states 
should work out for themselves.  The basis for his dissent is encapsulated in a 
story involving his clerk, who did not want to draft a dissenting opinion because 
he believed that the opposing side had reached the right decision.  Justice Reed 
asked him whether he favored a “kritarchy.”  The clerk did not know what the 
word meant, so Justice Reed pointed to the Oxford English Dictionary.  The word 
meant “government by judges.” . . . However, the clerk never wrote an opinion.  
Justice Warren approached his colleague and said, “Stan, you’re all by yourself in 
this now.  You’ve got to decide whether it’s really the best thing for the country.”  
Justice Reed gave his vote, though he reportedly never agreed with the decision 
handed down on May 17, 1954. 
Id. at 20. 
 3. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also, e.g., HARRY V. 
JAFFA, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 
(2000) (focusing almost exclusively on this conflict of right between the principled 
protagonists Calhoun and Lincoln, with Douglas the man without principle). 
 4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 6. See RV v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 321 F. Supp. 2d 538, 539-40 (E.D.N.Y 
2004); Symposium, Brown v. Board of Education at Fifty: Have We Achieved its Goals?, 78 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253 (2004); Jack B. Weinstein, Brown v. Board of Education After Fifty 
Years, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Weinstein, Brown v. Board of 
Education]; see also infra sources cited at note 18. 
 7. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2003). 
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unnecessary cruelties that result when real human beings before the court 
are treated as cyphers rather than individuals.  That struggle is not yet 
resolved, though unrelenting pressure by trial judges and others for 
rationality and justice may be having some effect.8
This Article discusses the exercise of judicial independence by judges 
who have opposed racism and other legally-sanctioned injustices, as well as 
judicial failures to oppose injustice.  In illustrating the range of options 
available to judges faced with the prospect of enforcing unjust laws, only 
one is ruled out: silent acquiescence.  In Germany, the Nazi judges’ silence, 
compliance, and active participation in the gravest crimes against humanity 
serves as a reminder that the duty to decide cases in accordance with 
statutes, precedent, or regulations cannot be absolute.
 
9
As Professor Maria Marcus’s article Austria’s Pre-War Brown v. Board 
of Education
 
10 shows, the Austrian Constitutional Court chose to nullify a 
1931 Nazi-inspired effort to separate Jewish and Christian students in 
Universities rather than to adopt a readily available basis for refusing the 
case.11  This judicial choice, made despite pressure and peril, warded off 
legally imposed university segregation until the Anschluss of Germany and 
Austria seven years later.12
The episode described in Professor Marcus’s analysis of the Vienna pre-
Nazi court decision protecting Jews from unlawful discrimination in the 
universities was unusual.  Despite strong efforts of President Woodrow 
Wilson and others to protect the rights of Jews and other minorities after 
World War I, their protective work and those of treaties on which they 
 
 
 8. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 
81 (1996); United States v. Khan, 325 F. Supp. 2d 218 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (use of jury to 
ameliorate sentencing under guidelines); United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1255 
(D. Utah 2004); Laurie P. Cohen, Judge Rejects Federal Rules on Sentencing, WALL ST. J., 
July 1, 2004, at B1. 
 9. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Judicial Positivism and Hitler’s Injustice, 93 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1807 (1993) (reviewing INGO MULLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD 
REICH (1991)).  Dubber notes Muller’s report stating that the legal profession in Germany 
refuses to admit to failure during the Nazi period; that Nazi judges and legal scholars 
continued in their careers; and that the courts of the Federal Republic have not voided any 
Nazi-era decisions.  Id. at 1811; see also EDWARD FELD, THE SPIRIT OF RENEWAL 123 (1994) 
(“Hitler used the instruments of Western legalism to accomplish his ends.”). 
 10. 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. ___ (2004). 
 11. Id. at ___.  The Pan-German press accused the court of breaking the law and called 
for nullification of the decision.  Id. at ___. 
 12. Id. at ___.  My reflections on Professor Maria Marcus’s article and its comparison of 
the Nazi system to pre-Brown Southern segregation arose also from my conversation with 
Professor Marcus on May 20, 2004 about Brown, Austria, and the vital significance of 
judicial independence. 
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insisted proved useless.13  Central European governments flouted treaty 
obligations and basic humanity, putting increasing pressure on the Jews, 
ultimately leading to the Holocaust.14  Austria, influenced in part by 
Germany, strongly rejected its own glorious tradition of artistic, economic, 
and scientific achievements in which the Jews had played such a large role 
since the turn of the century.  The Jews, despite their major contributions to 
Austria in World War I and afterwards, were declared outcasts, forced into 
nonpersonhood by the hoodlums and haters of the Right.15
The goal of the Nazis was to denigrate, segregate, and destroy.  The 
purpose of Jim Crow laws in the American South––segregation mandated 
by government as well as by custom––was to dehumanize, segregate, and 
reduce to peonage.
 
16
I had the honor of playing a minor role in working with NAACP counsel 
in Brown v. Board of Education, which ultimately cut the legs out from 
under Jim Crow and its legal foundation, Plessy v. Ferguson.
  Because of their color, African-Americans suffered 
gross social and economic disadvantages. 
17
 
 13. See HOWARD M. SACHAR, DREAMLAND: EUROPEANS AND JEWS IN THE AFTERMATH 
OF THE GREAT WAR 26 (2003) (detailing 1919 and later efforts of Louis Marshall, Cyrus 
Adler, Henry Mongenthau, and others to protect Jews against pogroms and other attacks by 
treaty and agreement). 
  As a junior 
faculty member at Columbia Law School, I was introduced to Thurgood 
Marshall and was entranced by what he and his colleagues were doing at 
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to obtain better education for African-
Americans.  My work involved research, writing and rewriting, listening to 
the debates, and occasionally interjecting minor comments or tactical 
considerations: should plaintiffs go for separate but real equality 
throughout the nation––an impossible position because it would have made 
it necessary to litigate in every one of the thousands of school districts––or 
should they insist on the position that segregation was inherently unequal 
and denigrating?  Marshall, Robert Carter, Constance Motley, Jack 
Greenberg, and many others launched a frontal attack on the separate-but-
equal rationale that they and so many others had been preparing for by 
cases leading up to Brown. 
 14. Id. passim.  On this and other forms of modern evil, see generally HANNAH ARENDT, 
THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1951) and SUSAN NEIMAN, EVIL IN MODERN THOUGHT: 
AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (2002). 
 15. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Nazis in the Courtroom: Lessons from the Conduct of 
Lawyers and Judges Under the Laws of the Third Reich and Vichy, France, 61 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1121 (1995). 
 16. See J. MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); JERROLD M. PACKARD, AMERICAN 
NIGHTMARE: THE HISTORY OF JIM CROW (2002). 
 17. See generally Weinstein, Brown v. Board of Education, supra note 6. 
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Chief Justice Earl Warren, in a magnificent piece of judicial 
statesmanship, pulled the Supreme Court Justices together in Brown.  The 
opinion had an enormous impact.  President Eisenhower and the federal 
legislature were ultimately forced to accept it.  Last year, I attended a 
conference at New York University where a Supreme Court Justice spoke.  
I asked him during the course of the discussion why the Supreme Court 
was not more active in developing new protective rights.  The response: 
“The court has an essentially passive, not an active role.” 
And then I asked, “What about Brown where you reversed Plessy?” 
The reply: “Well, Plessy and Brown were different.”18
Plessy was fundamentally unacceptable.  It was so foreign to The 
Declaration of Independence, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments, and post-World War II changes in demography and 
sociology that it simply could not be permitted to stand.  If all were 
acknowledged to have been created equal under our founding document of 
July 4, 1776, then forced legal separation was anathema as a matter of basic 
foundational pre-constitutional law. 
 
I.  JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND SENIOR FEDERAL JUDGES 
The current sentencing regime in the United States is an instructive 
starting point for exploring judicial reactions to unjust laws.  Federal drug 
statutes relegate some of the least culpable participants to decades in prison 
without possibility of parole.  Given the large number of drug cases that 
come before federal judges––some half of all criminal cases19
 
 18. Brown was different.  See LEE COKORINOS, THE ASSAULT ON DIVERSITY (2003) 
(introduction by Theodore M. Shaw); ROBERT COTTROL ET. AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003); JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADER 
IN THE COURTS: LEGAL BATTLES OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (50th Ann. ed. 2004); 
OLIVER W. HILL, THE BIG BANG: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BEYOND (2000); 
Elaine R. Jones, Forward to GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING 
DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996); RICHARD 
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK 
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 751 (Rev. ed. 2004); CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY, 
EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW (1998); CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (2004); 
Robert L. Carter, Thirty-Five Years Later: New Perspectives on Brown, in RACE IN 
AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 83 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr., eds. 1993); 
HARVARD LAW SCH., Harvard to Celebrate 50th Anniversary of Brown v. Board of 
Education (Apr. 8, 2004), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2004/04/brown_v_board/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2004). 
––and the 
 19. See Marc Miller & Daniel J. Freed, Editors’ Observations: The Disproportionate 
Imprisonment of Low-Level Drug Offenders, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 3 (1994).  In 1992, 
according to a Bureau of Prisons Researcher, drug offenders accounted for more than half of 
federal criminal cases, and more than 60% of the federal prison population.  Id. 
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grotesque over-sentencing often required, this is no small example of 
injustice but a problem of national dimension measured in unnecessarily 
destroyed lives and huge wasted costs to taxpayers.  As one of my 
colleagues put it, “Courage in public life means not only the fortitude to 
withstand criticism and even outrage, but the strength as well to examine 
one’s conscience and soul and to speak from the truth and conviction that 
we know lies deep within our hearts.”20
The judge who made that statement took senior status to be able to 
refuse cases that required him to impose lengthy sentences on minor drug 
offenders.
 
21  Some judges have relied upon their senior status to decline 
such cases.22
In following this dictate of morality, senior judges in our federal system 
may be at an advantage.  Senior status is not, as it is almost invariably 
characterized in the press, “retirement.”
  In weighing the merits of this action, we are reminded of the 
advice given to doctors: First, do no harm.  Judges should attempt to follow 
the same precept, which may mean refusing to decide cases in which an 
unjust result is preordained. 
23  It is rather a flexible tool 
permitting the retention by the system of the most experienced jurists at a 
time in their lives when they may need, or simply desire, to reduce their 
caseload.24
 
 20. Frank J. Battisti, Remarks to the Akron Bar Association, 18 AKRON L. REV. 353, 362 
(1985). 
  Because it permits judges to choose the cases they will hear, it 
 21. See, e.g., Mark Rollenhagen, Battisti Chooses Senior Status on District Court, 
PLAIN-DEALER (Cleveland), Mar. 24, 1994, at 1B (describing decision of Judge Frank J. 
Battisti to take senior status in light of “draconian” sentencing statutes). 
 22. See Joseph B. Treaster, Two Judges Decline Drug Cases, Protesting Sentencing 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at A1 (describing decisions by Judges Jack B.Weinstein 
and Whitman Knapp to exercise prerogative of senior status in refusing low-level drug 
importation cases); see also Stephen Labaton, Reno Moving to Reverse Stiff Sentencing Rule 
for Minor Drug Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1993, at A19 (“Federal officials estimate that 
dozens of senior judges, who have wide latitude in choosing their cases, are quietly refusing 
to hear drug prosecutions.”).  Subsequently, I took these cases because I could, at least, 
ameliorate some sentences. 
 23. See, e.g., Rollenhagen, supra note 21 (“Battisti’s retirement . . . creates a third 
opening on the District Court bench in Cleveland.”) (emphasis added).  28 U.S.C. §§ 294, 
371 also uses the term “retired” in connection with senior judges. 
 24. Senior judges retain most, but not all, of the perquisites of active judges.  For 
example, a senior judge must carry at least one-fourth the caseload of an active judge to 
participate in future salary increases.  See 28 U.S.C. § 371(e)(1) (2004).  More important, in 
the wake of a 1964 Judicial Conference Resolution, senior judges are subject to the 
requirement of being certified under 28 U.S.C. § 294, by the chief judge of the circuit, to 
continue serving.  For a critique of this provision, see Charles L. Brieant, Comment on 
Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts (Recommendations 65 & 66), at 2 (May 
24, 1995) (“demeaning” requirement of annual certification turns senior district judges into 
“second class citizen[s]”; it also “serves no present purpose, since senior and active judges 
alike are now subject to the ‘mental and physical disability’ proceedings authorized by 28 
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a priori permits them to make decisions about the types of cases they will 
hear. 
Some may see this as an unfortunate consequence of what is essentially 
a tool of “human resource” allocation.  Admittedly, a decision by a judge 
not to take a certain category of cases requires that other judges take those 
cases.  This argument from fairness, as Professor Raz puts it, “is that 
anyone who denies an obligation to obey in a just state take[s] unfair 
advantage of others who submit to such an obligation.”25
In the case of a senior judge refusing to hear drug cases, this argument is 
largely inapplicable for two reasons.  First is that what may be distasteful to 
one judge may not be to another.
 
26  Second is the possibility, which is real 
in the case of drug sentencing, that in the long (but not too long) run, the 
decision by the judge may influence higher authorities to change the drug 
laws, thus reducing the scope of the unjust obligation for all judges.  This 
has, in fact, apparently begun to happen.27
 
U.S.C. § 372”) (on file with author). 
 
  Judge Brieant elaborated on these concerns in his Request for Action by the Judicial 
Conference of the United States (June 19, 1995), in which he proposed eliminating the 
annual certification requirement.  According to Judge Brieant, this would be a logical 
extension of Recommendation 66, which states, “Judges should be encouraged to assume 
senior status through improvement of policies or procedures that affect senior judges.”  
Judge Brieant argued that the requirement of annual designation is offensive, not only to the 
district judges involved, but to the interest of the litigants who are entitled under Article III 
of the United States Constitution to a judge who is beholden to the law, the Constitution, his 
or her conscience, and nothing else.  Id. at 3. 
Judge Brieant observed: 
Once judges get such coercive power over other judges that they can determine 
the right of a judge to continue in office, or remove judges from their caseloads or 
from particular types of cases (all without a hearing or factual findings), the 
potential for abuse is so great that the subtle coercive effect created by what might 
take place in itself threatens judicial independence. 
Id. at 8 (emphasis in original). 
 25. JOSEPH RAZ, The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition, in ETHICS IN THE 
PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 325 (1994). 
 26. Reading the work of Professor Michael Paulsen, see infra text accompanying notes 
63-70, one is struck by the obvious fact that, while to some judges, decisions permitting 
abortion are unjust, to other judges, anti-choice decisions are abhorrent.  This suggests that, 
by refusing to take some kinds of cases, judges are “specializing.”  The merits of such 
specialization––which would diminish resistance to laws some judges consider unjust––are 
worth further consideration. 
 27. See Laurie P. Cohen & Gary Fields, Judge Rejects Federal Rules on Sentencing, 
WALL ST. J., July 1, 2004, at B1 (“The high court . . . never would have assembled a 
majority in the absence of the boiling frustration of the federal judiciary over the state of the 
federal sentencing system”) (internal quotations omitted); Labaton, supra note 22 
(“Emboldened by support from a growing number of Federal judges, Attorney General Janet 
Reno has begun to take the first steps toward reversing the policy of meting out tough 
criminal sentences for minor drug offenders.”).  Congress has also acted.  See 18 U.S.C. 
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Nonetheless, it has been suggested by some that senior judges who 
refused to take drug cases were demonstrating, and even fostering, 
disrespect for the rule of law.  One critic, argued that a senior judge whose 
moral scruples make enforcement of a current legal policy too painful has 
no alternative but to resign. 28  At least one Congressman,29 and a 
columnist,30 took similar positions.  Both the purpose and intent of the 
statute, however, leave me confident that senior judges were on safe 
ground, legally as well as ethically, in giving their morality effect rather 
than leaving the bench.31
The option of refusing to take certain kinds of cases is not as readily 
available to “active” federal judges, or to judges in state systems lacking an 
equivalent of “senior status”––though I would respect the decision of any 
active Article III or state judge who takes that position.  Thus the question 
of what is proper for senior judges is peripheral to a larger question: what 
may judges––generally––do to avoid the burdens of enforcing laws they 
believe to be fundamentally unjust.
 
32
 
§3553(f) (2004) (“safety valve” provision); Fred A. Bernstein, Discretion Redux: 
Mandatory Minimums, Federal Judges, and the ‘Safety Valve’ Provision of the 1994 Crime 
Act, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 765 (1995) (describing role of district judges in bringing about 
Congressional action); see also infra text accompanying note 140. 
  That is, how may a judge conform 
 28. See Avern Cohn, Letter to the Editor: A Questionable Exclusion, 78 JUDICATURE 5 
(1994) (responding to my argument that senior judges may properly exclude themselves 
from minor drug cases). 
 29. See Successful Drug War Can Afford to Shift Focus; The Judges Transgress, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 3, 1993, at A14 (letter from Congressman Charles E. Schumer) (“Judges should 
not pick and choose the laws they want to enforce . . . .  [T]he best way for them to make a 
change is to knock on Congress’s door and tell us what is happening in their courtrooms.”). 
 30. See A.M. Rosenthal, Dismantling the Drug War, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1993, at A21 
(suggesting that judges unhappy with drug laws should resign). 
 31. See 28 U.S.C. § 294(c) (a senior judge “may . . . perform such judicial duties within 
the circuit as he is willing and able to undertake”); see also Senior Judges Keep Court 
System Afloat, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1993, at A18 (letter from Steven Flanders, Circuit 
Executive, Second Judicial Circuit of the United States) (explaining senior judges’ actions 
in context of structure and procedures of district court). 
  In my own case, I began taking drug cases again in response to the passage by 
Congress of the “safety valve” provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).  This provision permits the courts 
to avoid imposing mandatory punishment for many first-time drug offenses.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 112-14. 
 32. Public servants of all kinds––not only judges––face decisions about whether to 
exercise conscience or conform to law (or, at least, their superiors’ conception of the law).  
See, JOHN P. BURKE, BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSIBILITY (1986); EDWARD WEISBRAND & 
THOMAS M. FRANCK, RESIGNATION IN PROTEST: POLITICAL AND ETHICAL CHOICES BETWEEN 
LOYALTY TO TEAM AND LOYALTY TO CONSCIENCE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (1975); 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1293 (1987); see also MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ 
ETHICS 44-52 (1991) (discussing lawyers’ ethical dilemmas in choosing and consulting with 
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his official actions to the dictates of his conscience? 
II. THE RANGE OF ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TOJUDGES 
FACED WITH UNJUST LAWS 
A.  Resignation 
Resignation in the face of unjust laws is a principled option, but it can 
also be seen as a defeat.  In extreme cases, it will result in replacement of 
“good” judges with government puppets, eliminating the last vestiges of 
justice.  This was the result in Peru in the early nineties where the 
dictatorial government replaced all judges, good and bad, with a 
subservient corps.33
Principled resignation is the route taken by at least two state judges who 
attributed their decisions to draconian sentencing laws, Lois Forer of 
Pennsylvania
 
34 and Robert Utter of Oregon,35
 
clients); Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury “Nullification”: When May and Should a Jury 
Reject the Law to Do Justice?, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239, 245-46 (1993) (discussing 
“executive nullification,” through pardon or amnesty) [hereinafter Weinstein, Considering 
Jury “Nullification”].  For a reminder that few lawyers can be courageous in every 
situation, see Monroe H. Freedman, Atticus Finch: Right and Wrong, 45 ALA. L. REV. 473 
(1994). 
 and probably many others 
  For lawyers––government or private––the decision to advise clients whose actions 
seem unjust raises complex ethical questions.  See Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, 
Toward “Neutral Principles” in the Law: Selections from the Oral History of Herbert 
Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 854 (1993) (including Prof. Herbert Wechsler’s description of 
his decision to participate in the writing of briefs supporting the government’s position in 
the Japanese internment case, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).  Professor 
Wechsler recalls: “I think what we provided was what the Court was entitled to and what the 
government was entitled to.  After all, the responsible person in Korematsu was the 
President of the United States.”  Id. at 886.  The authors of the article note that: 
The ABA Canons of Professional Ethics . . . in effect at the time of Wechsler’s 
supervision of the briefs defending Japanese internment policies provided 
[that] . . . [i]f the client insists upon an unjust or immoral course in the conduct of 
his case, or if he persists over the attorney’s remonstrance in presenting frivolous 
defenses, . . . the lawyer may be warranted in withdrawing on due notice to the 
client. 
Id. at 886 n.91 (citing ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 44 (1978)). 
 33. See Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges’ Learning, Speaking and Acting: Part II 
Speaking and Part III Acting, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 3 (1994) [hereinafter Weinstein, 
Limits on Judges’ Learning, Speaking, and Acting], and sources cited therein. 
 34. See LOIS G. FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF 
MANDATORY SENTENCING 13 (1994) (describing decision to step down rather than impose a 
mandatory minimum term); see also id. at 4-5 (describing similar decisions by other 
sentencing judges). 
 35. See Jim Simon & Jack Broom, Utter Quitting Supreme Court––Justice Says He 
Can’t Be Party to State’s Capital Punishment, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 29, 1995, at A1 
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who chose not to explain their decisions.  Resignation in such cases has 
tragic consequences both for the judges whose judicial careers are cut short 
and for the system.  As with senior judges, it is subject to the burden-
shifting critique in jurisdictions where appointment and confirmation of 
judges is a time-consuming process.36  More importantly, resignation 
deprives the bench of some of those who may be most inclined to try to 
encourage positive changes in controlling law.37  The proponents of the 
unjust laws emerge the victors.38
Historically, America’s gravest legally-sanctioned injustice was slavery.  
The reaction of judges to the laws of slavery was, as Professor Robert 
Cover has documented, largely disappointing, although the judiciary did 
not entirely succumb to such “controlling” caselaw as Dred Scott.
  In the case of a thoroughly bankrupt 
regime, however, mass resignation coupled with public statements may 
precipitate reform.  In Nazi Germany, mass resignation of judges––
especially if they gave their reasons––might have helped. 
39  
Professor Cover devoted much of his career to the problem of judicial 
responses to unjust laws.  His book, Justice Accused,40 grew out of a far 
more radical polemic prompted by the Vietnam War.41
 
(quoting justice Utter as saying “I could no longer serve in a legal system that takes human 
life”).  Justice Utter later explained that his decision to resign was influenced by his reading 
of a book about the co-opting of judges in Nazi Germany, which he analogized to “his own 
moral struggles.”  See Kery Murakami et al., Book Influenced Judge to Quit Post, SEATTLE 
TIMES, March 30, 1995, at B4. 
  In that opening 
 36. Moreover, resignation prompted by a recently enacted and highly publicized set of 
laws, such as the Sentencing Guidelines, would presumably result in the appointment of a 
judge reconciled to the new system. 
 37. Of course, some judges who resign may feel that, freed from the restraints on 
judicial speech, see text accompanying notes 164-74, infra, they are able to be more 
effective advocates for change than they could be from the bench.  See CODE OF CONDUCT 
FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, Canon 3(A)(6) (1992) (“A judge should avoid public comment 
on the merits of a pending or impending action.”). 
 38. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on Seven Lean Years of Guidelines 
Sentencing, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 12 (1995) (suggesting that recently appointed judges, 
who have never known another system, will be more likely to accept the inequities of the 
Guidelines); cf. Jack B. Weinstein & Mae Quinn, Some Reflections on the Federal Judiciary 
Role During the War on Drugs, in THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 269 (Sean 
Doran & John Jackson eds., 2000); Jack B. Weinstein & Nicholas Turner, The Cost of 
Avoiding Injustice by Guideline Circumventions, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 298 (1997); Jack 
B. Weinstein, The Effect of Sentencing on Women, Men, the Family, and the Community, 5 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 169 (1996). 
 39. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 40. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
(1975) [hereinafter COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED]. 
 41. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the 
Themes of Robert M. Cover’s Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 33 (1989) (describing 
Robert M. Cover, Book Review, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1968) (reviewing RICHARD 
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salvo, he drew on the memory of the Holocaust and the “screaming silence 
of the German people”42
No judge has resigned in protest.  No judge has availed himself of the 
opportunity presented by a draft case to instruct the public on the moral 
issues of the war.  No judge has publicly engaged in creative judicial 
obstruction of the war effort.
 to excoriate the federal judiciary of the 1960’s for 
“remain[ing] faithful to its long tradition as executors of immoral law” in 
enforcing the draft laws of the Vietnam era: 
43
That article was followed by seven years of research into the behavior of 
anti-slavery judges, during which Cover was apparently somewhat 
chastened.  The final version of Justice Accused, observes Professor 
Michael Paulsen, “cooled very nearly to the point of being a mild apologia 
for [the anti-slavery judges’] fidelity to law and faithlessness to moral 
conscience.”
 
44
Robert Cover, in Justice Accused . . . well describes the dilemma of 
federal judges required to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law [which required 
federal judicial officers to return to captivity slaves who had escaped to 
“free” states, as well as the Dred Scott decision] when they thought it 
repugnant to their moral values.  Pre-Civil War judges who could not 
enforce that law in good conscience, rather than simply recusing 
themselves and passing on the obligation to another judge, left the 
bench.
  As Judge Avern Cohn similarly noted: 
45
 Obviously, a history, however illuminating, of what one group of judges 
did is not a guide to the full range of options available to other judges.  
Moreover, I am not convinced that Cover presented the whole picture.  
Some Northern judges did avoid the harsh pro-slavery rules laid down by 
the Taney Court.
 
46
The Dred Scott decision, with a split court and dissenting opinions, was 
  And they had considerable justification for doing so. 
 
HILDRETH, ATROCIOUS JUDGES: LIVES OF JUDGES INFAMOUS AS TOOLS OF TYRANTS AND 
INSTRUMENTS OF OPPRESSION (1856))) [hereinafter Cover, Book Review]. 
 42. Cover, Book Review, supra note 41, at 1006. 
 43. Id. at 1005-06 (footnotes omitted).  In fact, in the Eastern District of New York, 
judges were far from unresponsive to problems raised by the Vietnam conflict, a problem 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 44. Paulsen, supra note 41, at 82-88. 
 45. See Cohn, supra note 28, at 5. 
 46. See, e.g., CARL B. SWISHER, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: THE HISTORY 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES––THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, at 5 (1974).  
Of particular interest are Chapters XXV (Aftermath of the Scott Case) and XXVI (The 
Booth Cases and Northern Nullification). See also William W. Fisher III, Ideology, 
Religion, and Constitutional Protection of Private Property, 39 EMORY L.J. 65, 121-31 
(1990) (discussing actions taken in Northern Courts to avoid enforcing Fugitive Slave 
Laws). 
CHRISTENSENWIENSTEIN 2/3/2011  9:58 PM 
112 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. XXXII 
not preordained by ruling case law.47  According to Dean Russell Osgood, 
“Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott . . . took his personal and 
political preference for slavery and a bolt-out-of-the-blue political 
resolution . . . and attempted to superimpose both on the legal order.”48  
Similarly, Professor Carl Swisher refers to Dred Scott as “a major disaster, 
degrading the Court and the Constitution . . . .”49  Given this background, it 
is not surprising that nullification by Northern judges, in part through 
standard interpretative practices and the distinguishing of cases did occur. 
50  In 1860 the New York Court of Appeals, in Lemmon v. People,51 
allowed grants of freedom to slaves that were brought into New York on 
the way to the South; concurring, one judge wrote: “[T]he exclusive right 
of the State of Missouri to determine and regulate the status of persons 
within her territory, was the only point in judgment in the Dred Scott case, 
and all beyond this was obiter.”52
But even if Professor Cover’s history were complete, it would be merely 
descriptive and in no way proof that acquiescence or resignation are the 
only alternatives available to judges who oppose a current policy on moral 
grounds.  Justice Cardozo has reminded us that the law progresses in a 
human and humane framework and adjusts to the needs of society.
 
53
 
 47. SWISHER, supra note 46, at 628-30 (noting Justice Cardozo’s approval of the dissent 
in Dred Scott by Justice Curtis).  Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes referred to Dred Scott 
as a “self-inflicted wound.” Id. at 631. 
  And, 
 48. Russell K. Osgood, The Enterprise of Judging, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 13, 17-
18 (1994) (describing Justice Taney’s jurisprudential errors). 
 49. SWISHER, supra note 46, at 631; see also Book Note, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1279 (1952) 
(reviewing VINCENT C. HOPKINS, DRED SCOTT’S CASE (1951) and noting arguments that “the 
decision weakened the court’s prestige so much that it was unable to properly prevent 
executive and legislative excesses in the ensuing years”).  The New York Tribune, on March 
7, 1857, editorialized that the decision was “entitled to just so much moral weight as would 
be the judgment of a majority of those congregated in any Washington bar-room.” Id. at 
1280. 
 50. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 193 (1960) 
(“Judges are to answer to the Law (which is so much more than the Rules of law) and also, 
if they can, to sense and justice.”); see SWISHER, supra note 46, at 653-75; see also Kirsten 
Sauer, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury About Mandatory Sentencing 
Consequences, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1258-59 (1995) (noting that “[j]ury acquittals 
contributed to the downfall of the Fugitive Slave Act” and suggesting that in periods of 
social upheaval “nullification plays [a significant role] in our democratic system”). 
 51. 20 N.Y. 562 (1860). 
 52. Id. at 624; see also PAUL FINKELMAN, FUGITIVE SLAVES AND AMERICAN COURTS––
INTRODUCTION (1988); cf. Charles Sumner, Our Immediate Antislavery Duties (speech given 
at Faneuil Hall, Boston, Nov. 6, 1850), in CHARLES SUMNER, THE WORKS OF CHARLES 
SUMNER 398, 403-11 (1870) (vowing to defy Fugitive Slave Law, even if “elsewhere, 
individuals may forget humanity, in fancied loyalty to law”) (emphasis added). 
 53. Myriam J. Altman, The Lessons of Justice Cardozo, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 7, 1995, at 2 
(quoting Cardozo’s famous statement that “when a rule, after it has been duly tested by 
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Professor Roscoe Pound observed that “[l]aw cannot depart far from ethical 
custom nor lag far behind.  For law does not enforce itself.  Its machinery 
must be set in motion . . . and guided by individual human beings [rather 
than by] abstract . . . legal precept[s].”54
Developments in legal academia in the last half century have alerted us 
to the full array of options available to judges
 
55––they range between the 
poles of resignation, on the one end, and mechanical and wooden 
adherence to precedent, on the other.56  It may be that, partly in response to 
these academic movements which may to some extent have the effect of 
self-fulfilling prophesies, or in response to larger changes in society, we 
have all become more accepting of efforts by common law judges to 
maneuver within the confines of controlling lines of cases.57
This transition since the Taney era is implicit in Professor G. Edward 
White’s statement, in explaining the transcendent importance of Justices 
Holmes and Brandeis: at “the close of the nineteenth century [they] were 
still unusual among lawyers and judges in . . . rejecting the jurisprudential 
orthodoxy that legal principles were not created by the judges who applied 
them . . . .”
 
58
 
experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social 
welfare, there should be less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment.” (quoting 
BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150 (1921))). 
  Society has grown accustomed to the idea, however radical 
 54. ROSCOE POUND, LAW AND MORALS 122 (Rothman Reprints, Inc. 1969) (1924); see 
also Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 
568 (1994) (“Ethical and legal norms out of touch with real life lead not to morality but to 
hypocrisy, abuse, and waste.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism––Responding to Dean 
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1238-39 (1931) (arguing that the “rule of law” has never 
really existed because judges have always made law using “rules” to make their decisions 
seem plausible); cf. Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 156 
(1994) (“[Judges] must always deny their authority to make law, even when they are making 
law.”). 
 56. The issue of enforcement of unjust laws often arises not as the duty to enforce unjust 
statutory law, but to enforce unjust case law.  That is because, under our system, any judge, 
at any level, has the power to declare a law unconstitutional.  It is only after a higher court 
upholds the questionable law, as it did with the statute creating the sentencing commission, 
that the lower court’s compliance with the law becomes a duty. 
 57. Cf. Lord Woolf, Access to Justice, at 109 ¶30 (Interim Report to the Lord 
Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales, June 1995), notes that British 
jurists, interviewed by Professor Baldwin, presented widely differing views about the extent 
to which they should be constrained by legal principles.  Some saw it as their unequivocal 
duty to apply the principles of English law, while those at the other end of the spectrum 
spoke of a wider responsibility to “do justice” even if that meant disregarding the strict 
requirements of the law and adopting a more common sense approach in some cases.  See 
also id. at 109 ¶31 (noting “the lack of any detailed evidence as to the circumstances under 
which one judge will “follow the law” and another will “do justice.”). 
 58. G. Edward White, The Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology and 
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in the early Holmes and Brandeis years, that judges do not merely follow, 
but make, law.  So complete is this shift in perception that it may be time to 
replace the phrase “line of cases” with “band of cases,” the addition of a 
concept of width giving a clearer picture of our view of legal precedent 
after almost a century of legal realism and other myth-puncturing academic 
movements.59
That Professor Cover recognized the dynamism of our legal system––
and the give-and-take between law and morals––is clear.  He wrote: 
 
In a static and simplistic model of law, the judge caught between law and 
morality has only four choices.  [1] He may apply the law against his 
conscience.  [2] He may apply conscience and be faithless to the law.  [3] 
He may resign.  [4] Or he may cheat: He may state that the law is not 
what he believes it to be and, thus preserve an appearance (to others) of 
conformity of law and morality.60
Cover’s second and fourth options ignore the great flexibility of the 
American common law and its historical forms of interpretation.  In a 
 
 
Judicial Reputations 5 (Mar. 5, 1995) (unpublished manuscript). 
 59. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Non-Legal Theory in Judicial Decisionmaking, 17 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 87-88 (1994) (stating that judges seek to “identify legal principles that 
deserve to be extended into the future.  In such cases, legal argument attempts to connect 
past decisions with current outcomes through the construction of . . . ‘narratives of deserved 
continuity’”) (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 238-39 (1986)); Osgood, The 
Enterprise of Judging, supra note 48, at 15 (“[J]udges should not just look in the immediate 
zone of a particular rule, statute, or prior decision, but across the entire legal system to 
resolve ambiguities and answer hard questions.”).  In his book, POSTMODERN LEGAL 
MOVEMENTS, Gary Minda writes: 
There was also a real danger presented by neutral process thinking––there was the 
possibility that process theorists might fail to support morally correct results in 
particular cases.  Process theorists failed to establish that there was a necessary 
analytical link between their theory of process and the achievement of social 
justice.  The reality of racial inequality and disadvantage, justified and enforced 
by the judiciary, was hardly the basis for believing in legal process claims of 
justice through neutral modes of decision making. 
GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS 42 (1995) (emphasis in original). 
 60. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 40, at 6 (emphasis added).  Professor Cover 
continues: 
Once we assume a more realistic model of law and of the judicial process, these 
four positions become only poles setting limits to a complex field of action and 
motive.  For in a dynamic model, law is always becoming. And the judge has a 
legitimate role in determining what it is that the law will become.  The flux in law 
means also that the law’s content is frequently unclear.  We must speak of 
direction and of weight as well as of position. Moreover, this frequent lack of 
clarity makes possible “ameliorist” solutions. The judge may introduce his own 
sense of what “ought to be” interstitially, where no “hard” law yet exists.  And, he 
may do so without committing the law to broad doctrinal advances (or retreats). 
Id. 
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sophisticated analysis of the role of appellate courts and trial courts in 
predicting future trends in the law, Professor Llewellyn described the many 
techniques used by judges in giving due weight to stability and yet 
avoiding and circumventing dubious precedents.61  In criminal cases––in 
which grave injustice is most likely to occur––the rule of lenity establishes 
a duty in the face of statutory ambiguity not to take the path of least 
resistance, but one that leads to the most favorable result for the 
defendant.62
B.  Disobedience and distinguishing cases 
  The widespread acceptance of this rule suggests a universal 
understanding of the discretionary aspects of the role of judges in statutory 
interpretation. 
1.  Must lower courts obey higher-court precedent? 
Among legal academics, the duty of lower courts to follow superior 
court precedents has been the subject of considerable debate.  One 
contributor to that discussion is Professor Michael Paulsen, whose views 
may have been influenced by his opposition to abortion.  Paulsen argues 
that “lower court judges can, and should, disregard the authority of Roe v. 
Wade.”63  Noting that “all federal judges, at least, hold their authority 
under equivalent commissions,”64
While lower courts may be “inferior” in the hierarchy––i.e., their 
decisions can be countermanded by a higher tribunal––they are not 
 he suggests that: 
 
 61. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
(1960). 
 62. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term: 
Foreword—Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 104 (1994) (noting the importance 
of rule of lenity in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence); Sarah Newland, Note, The Mercy 
of Scalia: Statutory Construction and the Rule of Lenity, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 
228 (1994) (“The rule of lenity should serve . . . to inform the entire process of 
interpretation . . . .”); see generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 
HARV. L. REV.  457, 461 (1897) (“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and 
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”). 
 63. Paulsen, supra note 41, at 82 (discussing Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
The argument for the power of lower courts to ‘underrule’ the Supreme Court 
is . . . straightforward . . . .  First, the judge’s obligation, by oath, is to the 
Constitution, not to the Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution.  There 
is nothing morally disingenuous in taking the oath and disobeying ‘controlling’ 
precedent. . . .  There may be Supreme Court opinions that hold . . . that lower 
court judges are bound . . . to uphold . . . the precedents of higher courts.  But that 
only begs the question of whether lower courts are bound to follow the holdings of 
the Supreme Court . . . . 
Id. at 82-83. 
 64. Id. at 83 n.132 (emphasis added). 
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constitutionally subordinate in terms of either their duties under the 
Constitution or their relationship to higher courts.  Reviewing courts have 
no power to remove lower court judges from office, reduce their pay, or 
hold them in contempt, at least not in the federal system . . . .  So long as 
the lower court may still be reversed by the higher court, there is no 
interference with either the “supremacy” of the Supreme Court or with the 
idea of the rule of law. . . .  The asserted need for “uniformity” is not 
threatened. . . .  [O]nly the costs of enforcing uniformity are new.65
He concludes that “underruling” may in fact “be an essential part of the 
process of judicial self-correction,” giving as an example the Supreme 
Court’s powerful defense of religious liberty in West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette.
 
66  Barnette affirmed a decision by a three-judge 
district court panel that “underruled” the Supreme Court’s prior, anti-First 
Amendment holding in Minersville School District v. Gobitis.67
Ultimately, to Paulsen, the problem with underruling is simply a 
pragmatic one: 
 
[W]ere judges to choose such a course on every issue on which they 
disagreed with higher courts, the smooth functioning of the judicial 
system might rapidly break down.  This is an important consideration for 
deciding when an issue is sufficiently important that the conscientious 
judge should flout controlling precedent.68
As he notes, however, a judge who chooses such a course “will be reversed 
(and chastised) by a reviewing court, and directed to enter an order based 
on the unjust and unjustifiable precedent.”
 
69  At that point, he suggests, the 
appropriate responses are “criticism, recusal, and, if necessary, 
resignation.”70
Another contributor to the debate––one without an apparent explicit 
substantive goal––is Professor Evan H. Caminker, who reviews the history 
of and rationales for the “rule” that lower courts must follow the dictates of 
superior tribunals.
  Thus, he concedes, judicial disobedience cannot flout or 
trump appellate control. 
 71
 
 65. Id. at 84-85; see also Note, Lower Court Disavowal of Supreme Court Precedent, 60 
VA. L. REV. 494, 495 (1974)  (“[I]t is unclear exactly what it means for a lower court to be 
‘bound’ by a prior decision. As a practical matter, since the Supreme Court cannot hire and 
fire judges, a lower court is bound only in the sense that it can be reversed on appeal.”). 
  Along the way, he discards a number of possible 
 66. 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Paulsen, supra note 41, at 85. 
 67. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
 68. Paulsen, supra note 41, at 86 (emphasis in original). 
 69. Id. at 88.  For a discussion of the duty of a judge in the face of a specific mandate, 
see text accompanying notes 110-21, infra. 
 70. Paulsen, supra note 41, at 88. 
 71. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court 
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reasons for such a rule––among them the assumption, probably held by 
many but unexamined by most, that higher courts are superior at 
determining the law.72  (If true, this would suggest that any district court 
should follow the holding of any court of appeals, something not required 
in our system.)  Professor Caminker concludes that the duty to follow direct 
precedent does in fact exist, although the route to that conclusion is far less 
obvious than might otherwise have been assumed.73
His primary support for the rule is pragmatic: “The doctrine[] . . . is 
justified by its service of various institutional values, including judicial 
economy, uniformity of interpretation, and decisional proficiency; these 
values are sufficiently weighty to overcome potential countervalues such as 
‘issue percolation’ or even ‘error correction’ by the lower courts.”
 
74  His 
utilitarian analysis of why judges would generally follow higher-court 
precedent suggests that the system would survive even if more freedom not 
to follow precedents were acknowledged.75  The problem is not whether a 
lower court can depart from precedent but when it should.  One of the 
shortcomings of utilitarianism as a guide to social policy is that it may 
ignore or even flout common views of morality.76
If a judge concludes that she is bound by her oath of office to diverge 
from precedent, what harm occurs?  According to Professor Paul Colby, the 
pragmatic and utilitarian arguments for acquiescing in injustice do not 
trump the moral imperative not to.
 
77  “The appellate courts can reverse [the 
trial judge], they can issue a writ of mandamus, and they can reassign the 
case to another judge.”78
 
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994) [hereinafter Caminker, Inferior Courts].  
Professor Caminker’s argument is limited to rules derived from other cases, rather than “the 
law of the case,” discussed in text accompanying notes 110-21, infra.  See also Evan H. 
Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court 
Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Caminker, Precedent and 
Prediction]. 
  He notes further that “[i]f the Supreme Court 
 72. Caminker, Inferior Courts, supra note 71, at 845. 
 73. Id. at 873. 
 74. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction, supra note 71, at 35. 
 75. Cf. Richard Posner, What Do Judges Maximize?, in OVERCOMING LAW 109, 124 
(1995) (leisure-seeking judges tend to avoid “hassle” by claiming their decisions are 
dictated by “the law.”). 
 76. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 208 (Paul Edwards ed., 1972) 
(“utilitarianism”). 
 77. Paul L. Colby, Two Views on the Legitimacy of Nonacquiescence in Judicial 
Opinions, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1041 (1987). 
 78. Id. at 1057 (footnotes omitted).  But see Jack B. Weinstein, The Limited Power of 
the Federal Courts of Appeals to Order a Case Reassigned to Another District Judge, 120 
F.R.D. 267 (1988) (making legal and prudential arguments against practice). 
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errs, no other court may correct it.”79
[a]ppeals . . . are taken from final judgments, not from judicial opinions.  
Thus, in the “right” cases, the Supreme Court has affirmed the decisions 
of lower court judges who, in lieu of employing the time-honored 
stratagems of distinguishment, conscious judicial by-pass and oversight, 
explicitly disapproved of applicable Supreme Court doctrine . . . .  The 
rules binding lower courts to adhere to precedent are, therefore, not 
compulsory but suasive.
  Yet, 
80
Some commentators have distinguished between categories of precedents.  
Professor Lawson takes the radical position that the Constitution requires 
that precedent––at least horizontal precedent––be recognized as non-
binding.  He argues: “[I]f courts have the duty. . . to decide cases according 
to the Constitution, and not according to legislative or executive 
determinations that conflict with the Constitution, then they . . . also have 
the duty to decide cases according to the Constitution and not according to 
prior (horizontal) precedent.”
 
81  Although he argues that the practice of 
employing precedent is “a sort of intellectual adverse possession [of the] 
constitution,”82 he warns litigants inclined to adopt his view in court that 
they can expect to be sanctioned.83
Even in the rarefied world of academic debate, Lawson’s view has been 
pronounced “clearly wrong.”
 
84
 
 79. Colby, supra note 77, at 1057 n.78 (quoting Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 705 
F.2d 1526, 1533 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1982), 
described in text accompanying note 92, infra. 
  Professor Charles Fried has observed: “If 
Lawson allows constitutional decisions to take into account anything other 
than the text of the Constitution itself, such as data about the world . . . then 
 80. Colby, supra note 77, at 1058-59 (footnotes omitted).  Professor Colby notes that 
“the Supreme Court itself abandoned strict adherence to the doctrine [of stare decisis] long 
ago because stare decisis, strictly speaking, requires a court to follow its own previous 
decisions.”  Id. at 1058. 
 81. Charles Fried, Reply to Lawson, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 35 (1994).  The 
debate about the limits of stare decisis is, of course, not new. 
[T]his rule [that precedents are binding] admits of exception, where the former 
determination is most evidently contrary to reason; much more if it be contrary to 
the divine law.  But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to 
make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation.  For if it be 
found that the former decision is not manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not 
that such a sentence was bad law, but that it was not law. 
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, at *69-*70. 
 82. Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 23, 33 (1994) (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 
232, 265 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Fried, supra note 81, at 35. 
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by what rationale must the Court’s prior decisions be excluded?”85
For purposes of this discussion, it is more important to note that Lawson 
never explains why his argument would not apply to vertical as well as 
horizontal precedent.  This provides an insight into the possible fallacy of 
his claim.
 
86
If we take seriously the idea that the Constitution is the supreme law . . . 
and perhaps that every person should interpret it directly and follow it, it 
is not clear that vertical precedent should be distinguished from horizontal 
precedent.  [Others have] made this point as well.  Mike Paulsen, for 
example, has argued that in some situations a lower court judge should 
simply say to a higher court: “Go ahead, make my day: reverse me.  
You’re wrong about the Constitution.  You’ve taken your oath of office, 
but that’s no excuse [for] violating mine.  I’m going to follow my oath of 
office and decide the Constitution correctly as I understand it.  If you 
don’t like it, take cert.
  As Professor Akhil Reed Amar notes: 
87
Amar himself is not certain that adherence to vertical precedent is required.  
He will go only so far as to note that there is “an implicit hierarchy that is at 
least permitted––perhaps compelled––by Article III, where the oaths of 
office and the interpretations of higher courts trump those of lower 
courts.”
 
88  Yet he fails to explain how Article III compels this “trumping,” 
an omission he appears to acknowledge implicitly in his half-hearted 
conclusion: “Precedents need not always be followed, but they are entitled 
to some rather than zero weight.”89
Other commentators have staked out a more definitive position.  
Professor Sanford Levinson argues that the duty to obey superior court 
 
 
 85. Id. at 38. 
 86. Akhil Reed Amar, On Lawson on Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39 (1994). 
 87. Id. at 41 (quoting Paulsen, supra note 41, at 82-88).  Of course, a lower court 
making such an argument might rely on the likelihood that the Supreme Court would not 
grant certiorari.  At the district court level, where the right of appeal is automatic from a 
final judgment, there is still no guarantee that the losing party will appeal. 
 88. Id. at 41 (emphasis added). 
 89. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).  Professor Frederick Schauer, too, notes that Professor 
“Lawson seeks to take the question of vertical precedent off the . . . agenda, but that effort is 
unavailing.”  Frederick Schauer, Precedent and the Necessary Externality of Constitutional 
Norms, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 47 n.10 (1994); see also Steven G. Calabresi & 
Gary Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on the Harris Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 
255, 276 n.106 (1992) (discussing the importance of precedent applied through vertical 
hierarchy in the judicial system).  Like Professor Fried, he argues that the duty to follow 
precedent––vertically as well as horizontally––is a question settled not by the Constitution, 
but by constitutional interpretation.  “Should the American people, or American judges, 
decide that judicial precedents should be authoritative in constitutional decisionmaking, and 
should count as part of what ‘the Constitution’ is, nothing in the Constitution itself could 
preclude such a social and political decision.”  Schauer, supra, at 55 (emphasis in original). 
CHRISTENSENWIENSTEIN 2/3/2011  9:58 PM 
120 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. XXXII 
precedents is a well-established matter of positive law,90 given the views of 
the Supreme Court on the subject.  For example, Hutto v. Davis91 chastised 
a court of appeals panel for having ignored the hierarchy of the federal 
court system created by the Constitution and Congress.  Precedent must be 
followed in order to prevent “anarchy,” the Court opined.92
Although Levinson recognizes the existence of some “outright defiance 
of hierarchy,”
 
93 he writes: “Nor, I suspect, would many of us, whatever our 
political views, wish to find many examples of such overruling in the 
respective legal reporters for the lower courts.”94  In a final hint that he 
acknowledges more room for judicial interpretation than his doctrinal 
arguments might suggest, he adds, in a footnote: “A very interesting article 
remains to be written about the use of the term ‘a case of first impression’ 
in legal opinions.”95
New law clerks, and even their colleagues, experienced trial and 
appellate judges, are startled to discover the number of “new” issues that 
arise each day in each court.  Our constantly changing society, and 
technology, as well as philosophical views, statutes, and precedents, require 
a renewal of the law as applied in every generation.  Application of the law 
  His point, apparently, is that precedent need not bind 
a judge who sees the problem before him as unresolved by existing case 
law. 
 
 90. Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: “Inferior” Judges and the Task 
of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843 (1993). 
 91. 454 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1982). 
 92. Id. at 375. 
 93. Levinson, supra note 90, at 851. 
 94. Id. “‘Inferior’ judges know their place, as it were, which is the enforcement of the 
decisions of superiors, whatever their own views.”  Id. at 847.  It should, he argues, “be 
clear that the operating theory of the ‘inferior’ judiciary is precisely that the disciplined 
techniques of legal analysis take second place to obedience to the particular persons who 
contingently occupy the top positions in the judicial hierarchy.”  Id. at 849.  Levinson gives 
several examples of anguished acquiescence, including that of Stephen Reinhardt, The 
Supreme Court, The Death Penalty, and the Harris Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205, 206 (1992) 
(“Whatever our sorrow over the systematic erosion of established rights, we must continue 
to apply whatever decisions the Court issues. And we will do that.”).  Levinson describes 
this as “an interesting reversal of Andrew Jackson’s insistence that Supreme Court justices 
‘have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve.’”  See PAUL BREST & 
SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 49-52 (1992). 
  Yet, in the end, Levinson does not expect blind acquiescence from lower court 
judges.  Citing an article by Judge Posner on the interpretive duties of lower court judges, he 
notes: “Posner undoubtedly wrote for many more inferior judges than himself when he . . . 
rejected a role as a ‘potted plant.’  Still, I strongly suspect that the way that most such judges 
exercise their independence is through imaginative interpretation of the precedents.” 
Levinson, supra note 90, at 850-51 (citing Richard Posner, What Am I?  A Potted Plant?, 
NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1987, at 23 (“Everyone professionally involved with law knows 
that, as Holmes put it, judges legislate “interstitially”)). 
 95. Levinson, supra note 90, at 850 n.26. 
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to the incredible diversity of people and situations we see in court results in 
a shortage of “all fours” cases.  No judge alert to the myriad possibilities of 
creation and reinterpretation of the law that Llewellyn or Cardozo or 
Holmes or the others in the pantheon of legal heroes have taught us exist 
could treat the law as static. 
Respect for colleagues’ work and the desire to have uniformity in the 
law will almost invariably lead to following the rulings of other federal 
courts at both the trial and appellate level––whether within or without the 
circuit.96
2. Application of the duty of lower courts to follow higher-court precedent 
 
Conceding that lower courts should generally follow the dictates of 
superior courts tells us surprisingly little about trial judges’ obligations in 
real life.  The general principle applies only where, first, the rule of the 
superior court is clear, and, second, where intimations and other changes in 
case law, statutes or conditions have suggested that the rule will remain the 
same when the “right” case comes before the higher court, and, third, 
where that clear rule applies unequivocally to the facts before the lower 
court.  That eliminates a number of cases. 
First, depending on one’s definition, it is possible to conclude that few 
rules announced by appellate courts are clear and eternal.  This is 
increasingly so as more and more rules are issued.  The attempt, in recent 
years, to decide more appeals (both in absolute numbers and as a 
percentage of district court dispositions)97 may have the opposite of the 
courts’ intended effect.  As more “rules” are announced, each with slightly 
different intonation, the effect is a cacophony, the antithesis of a controlling 
law.98  Too much law begins to look suspiciously like little law.99
 
 96. It is rare that the legislature will explicitly require lower courts to follow the highest 
appellate court without deviation.  In an attempt to limit habeas corpus petitions from state 
prisoners, the petitioner must rely upon “a decision that . . . involved an unreasonable 
application of [] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  The provision has severely limited the power 
of the lower federal courts to interpret the Federal constitution in habeas cases. 
 
 97. See generally THOMAS E. BAKER, THE JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, RATIONING 
JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (1994) (describing 
explosion in number of cases heard by appellate courts). 
 98. As Judge Posner suggested in his opinion in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 
F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995), it is possible that the laws of fifty-one jurisdictions could 
be combined into a kind of legal “Esperanto.”  The laws of hundreds of appellate panels, 
however, are too disparate to be melded into a common tongue. 
 99. The Supreme Court, which has attempted to concentrate on the “law 
pronouncement” function, has been able to hear fewer and fewer cases.  See, e.g., Linda 
Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: The Overview; U.S. Justices Open Their New Session by 
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Second is the issue of distinguishing cases on their facts.  As Judge 
Guido Calabresi noted in a court of appeals dissent, “[F]acts are often 
surprising and always essential.”100
When it comes to understanding and coping with statistical evidence, the 
institutional advantage appears to be with the trial court.  In dealing 
directly with the expert witnesses and acquiring an intimate knowledge of 
the facts of the case, the trial judge has an opportunity that the appellate 
judge lacks for instruction on the role of statistical evidence in the case in 
question. . . .  [This may lead] appellate judges . . . to resolve statistical 
issues through law-like pronouncements . . . without either a full 
understanding of the issues raised or an appreciation of what good 
statistical methodology implies given the specific facts of the case.
  The district judge develops a 
“closeness” to the facts that cannot be replicated at the appellate level.  
This is true even, for example, when the facts are stated in terms of 
statistics––arguably the type of information most easily transmitted to a 
reviewing court.  As the Panel on Statistical Assessments as Evidence in 
the Courts concluded: 
101
The ability to distinguish cases on their facts is often congruent with the 
tenacity of the parties and the trier in developing the record.  As Judge 
Wyzanski noted: 
 
[T]he percentage and type of novel cases may depend on the judge’s own 
interests and his alertness to . . . novel points not fully appreciated by 
counsel.  Did MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. . . . and Palsgraf v. Long 
Island R.R. come to Judge Cardozo with what we now regard as their 
distinctive significance already marked––or was Judge Cardozo prepared 
by prior study and reflection to look for possibilities of extending the 
law . . . ?  Is it not true of original judges as of original scientists that 
“success comes out the prepared mind,” to use Pasteur’s phrase?102
 
Refusing Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1994, at A1 (noting that “[l]ast term, the Court decided 
only 84 cases, the lowest number since 1955, while receiving 6,897 [petitions]”). 
 
 100. Giano v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050, 1062 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., dissenting); 
see also United States v. Kinder, 64 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1995).  In Kinder, Judge Pierre 
Leval’s ringing dissent identifies discrepancies between the methods of weighing LSD for 
mandatory minimums and Sentencing Guidelines purposes.  64 F.3d at 761-73. 
 101. PANEL ON STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS, THE EVOLVING 
ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS 82 (Stephen E. Fienberg 
ed., 1989); see also United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1156 (2d Cir. 1989) (when 
a finder of fact has “pieced[d] together circumstantial evidence,” a “reviewing court must 
view . . . [the] evidence not in isolation but in conjunction”).  This is no less true when the 
finder has pieced together statistical and non-statistical proof.  See also Verizon Directories 
Corp. v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting the need for 
increased pedagogical devices at trial and appellate level in complex and science-based 
cases). 
 102. Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., A Trial Judge’s Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. 
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Dean Russell Osgood has observed: “The greatest insight of the common-
law system was that . . . additions or emendations of fact sometimes require 
reanalysis of a legal rule.”103  This suggests that––to paraphrase Justice 
Holmes104
Trial judges have an obligation to decide all relevant issues before them, 
even when doing so forces them to confront difficult moral choices; they 
should not be deterred by fear of reversal at the appellate level.
––the life of a trial judge is not of the law, but of experience. 
105  The 
problem is not whether a trial judge has the obligation to move the law in a 
direction he or she deems principled, but the limits of what can be said––
much; and done––somewhat less.  In Judge Wyzanski’s still-timely words, 
“[n]o trial judge of any sense supposes his quality is measured by a naked 
tabulation of affirmances and reversals.”106  Even where it is clear that the 
appellate courts seem to be going in a different direction, trial judges must 
be true to an inner core of responsibility.107  They must sometimes risk, 
even court, reversal when necessary to make certain that the appellate 
courts, the bar, academia, and the public are fully aware that there is a 
strong opposing view.108  As a district judge, Learned Hand repeatedly, by 
dictum and holding, took positions contrary to current doctrine.  Many of 
these controversial positions subsequently became law.109
 
REV. 1281, 1301 (1952) (citations omitted). 
 
 103. Osgood, supra note 48, at 15 (noting that this reality “tug[s] against . . . the principle 
that like cases ought to be treated alike”). 
 104. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW *1 (1881) (“The life of the law has not been 
logic: it has been experience.”). 
 105. That is not to say that there are no consequences to speaking out.  One of the great 
men of the law was Samuel Seabury.  See HERBERT MITGANG, THE MAN WHO RODE THE 
TIGER: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE SAMUEL SEABURY (1963); W. Bernard Richland, Book 
Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV 180, 182 (1964).  Richland notes that after becoming a judge, 
Seabury “continued to denounce publicly” unpalatable decisions, including holdings by “the 
New York Court of Appeals striking down the Workmen’s Compensation Law, the 
Employers Liability Act, and other social legislation.”  Richland, supra, at 182.  Members 
of the Court of Appeals later told the Governor that because of Seabury’s outspokenness, 
“they would not welcome his appointment.” Id. 
 106. Wyzanski, supra note 102, at 1299.  But see Caminker, Precedent and Prediction, 
supra note 71, at 77-78 (listing reasons “lower court judges dislike being reversed on 
appeal”). 
 107. Cf. Freeman Dyson, The Scientist as Rebel, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 25, 1995, at 31 
(“I feel myself a traveler on a journey that is far longer than the history of nations.”). 
 108. See Charles E. Clark, A Plea for the Unprincipled Decision, 49 VA. L. REV. 660 
(1963) (criticizing Professor Wechsler’s view of neutral principles as re-enforcing dead 
hand of the law and applauding “unprincipled” decisions in landmark cases such as Brown 
that represent progress and evolution); see also Deborah Pines, Second Circuit Panel 
Transfers Bias Case to Another Trial Judge, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 17, 1994, at 1 (describing McLee 
v. Chrysler Corp., 38 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1994), in which the trial judge who challenged the 
Second Circuit’s summary judgment standard was chastised by the appellate court). 
 109. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 148-49, 329 
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I am not suggesting that every reversal is predicated on a dispute about a 
matter of principle.  All judges make errors.  Only a small percentage of 
cases present a basis for moral or technical-legal disagreement between 
trial and appellate judges. 
3. The exception for specific mandates 
Trial judges have the obligation to maintain the pressure for sound 
interpretation when they see grave and unnecessary injustice.  
Occasionally, they will be reversed in a harsh opinion, but that possible 
slight to their egos cannot and should not be permitted to inhibit them.  
Trial judges protected by Article III are, like their appellate court 
colleagues, expected to use their independence to help guarantee a fair and 
effective system of justice. 
There are, of course, limits.  If the trial court can find no reasoned way 
to distinguish precedents, acquiescence in the courtroom––but not silence–
–is required.  In the face of a specific mandate, a trial judge has no 
alternative but to follow the court of appeals’ instructions.110  By contrast, 
there can be no obligation to reach an unjust decision in deference to an 
indirect or hypothetical decision of a superior court.111
To cite a pertinent example, a court of appeals panel ordered a district 
court judge to increase the sentence of a young mother of three small 
children, who was a peripheral and minor figure in a drug transaction, to 
  Even this rule, 
however, may leave a judge great latitude, within the language of the 
mandate, to reach the most just result. 
 
(1994) (discussing United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)); id. at 151-70 
(discussing Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d, 246 F. 24 
(2d Cir. 1917)); id. at 340-42 (discussing United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 
1936)).  Hand’s correspondence and activities with Justices Felix Frankfurter, Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Professor Zachariah Chaffee, Jr., and many others about these and 
other cases were unethical by current standards. 
 110. See, e.g., United States v. Ekwunoh, 888 F. Supp. 369 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (history and 
interpretation of mandate rule).  A judge could refuse to obey, which would be a form of 
civil disobedience.  Civil disobedience is known in a variety of cultures.  See, e.g., Ina 
Friedman, To Obey Or Not to Obey?, JEWISH WEEK, July 21, 1995, at 28 (discussing ruling 
by prominent Israeli rabbis forbidding soldiers and civilians from participating in the 
evacuation of the West Bank); cf. Calvin Trillin, State Secrets, NEW YORKER, May 29, 1995, 
at 54 (describing Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission, formed by the legislature in 
1956 to “do and perform any and all acts and things deemed necessary and proper to protect 
the sovereignty of the State of Mississippi . . . from encroachment thereon by the federal 
government.”). 
 111. Cf. United States v. DeRiggi, 45 F.3d 713, 717 (2d Cir. 1995) (deciding in part, 
based on prediction of how Supreme Court would decide case); see generally Evan H. 
Caminker, Precedent and Prediction, supra note 71 (discussing if and when “lower” courts 
should decide cases on the basis of assumptions about how “higher” courts would act). 
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ten years in prison without any possibility of parole.112  Even the 
prosecutor offered, after winning the appeal, to stipulate to a lower 
sentence.  The trial judge postponed the sentence so that the parties could 
petition the court of appeals to amend its mandate.  The court of appeals 
denied the petition.  As it turns out, intervention by Congress, in the form 
of the “safety valve” provision of the 1994 crime act,113 was the deus ex 
machina that permitted the imposition of a more humane sentence despite 
the call for harshness by the remand.114
In another instance, the district court sentenced a number of defendants 
who were involved in a municipal bribe-taking scheme.
  
115  The culpability 
of the defendants varied widely.  Some were organizers of the scheme; 
others merely followed instructions.  Under the Guidelines, all the 
defendants would have received essentially the same sentence.  The district 
judge, finding this result unconscionable, sentenced the defendants in 
proportion to their culpability.  As a result, the least blameworthy 
defendants received sentences below the applicable Guidelines range.  On 
appeal by the government of the sentences of some of these least culpable 
defendants, the court of appeals ordered the district court to resentence 
them in accordance with the Guidelines.116
By the time the case came back to the trial court on remand,
  This meant that the district 
judge could––and was in all likelihood expected to––sentence them to 
substantially longer terms in prison than he had initially imposed. 
117
[A]t the time of resentencing, one defendant was eight days away from 
the end of a one-year prison term.  He was well into the 
deinstitutionalization process.  He had moved to a community facility to 
assist in obtaining employment, and had begun psychologically to 
reestablish family ties.  His children––three of whom appeared in court––
awaited his arrival home with intense anticipation.  To add a second year to 
his sentence would have been cruel, and would have exacted a far higher 
price from the defendant and his family than the imposition, at the outset of 
 a year 
had passed since the initial sentencing proceedings.  Thus the sentencing 
court considered a far different set of facts than it had faced the first time, 
which the court of appeals had considered in the record on appeal: 
 
 112. United States v. Ekwunoh, 12 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1993), vacating 813 F. Supp. 168 
(E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 113. 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) (1994). 
 114. United States v. Ekwunoh, 888 F. Supp. 369 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 115. United States v. Abbadessa, 848 F. Supp. 369 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), vacated by United 
States v. DeRiggi 45 F.3d 713 (2d Cir. 1995), modified on remand, 893 F. Supp. 171 
(E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 116. United States v. DeRiggi, 45 F.3d 713 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 117. United States v. DeRiggi, 893 F. Supp. 171 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
CHRISTENSENWIENSTEIN 2/3/2011  9:58 PM 
126 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. XXXII 
a significantly longer prison term. 
Another of these defendants had already been released.  He described in 
detail his efforts to reestablish ties with his wife and two children since his 
return home.  The relationships had been severely strained by his 
incarceration.  To send the defendant back to prison would have had far 
more serious consequences than initial imposition of a longer term.118
In the Second Circuit, sentencing judges can, and often do, depart from 
the prescribed Guidelines range when faced with extraordinary family 
circumstances.
 
119
In so finding, the sentencing court fully complied with the court of 
appeals mandate, which left open the possibility of downward departure on 
the basis of factors not considered at the initial sentencing proceedings.  
The mandate rule permits lower courts to take into account, on remand, any 
issue that was not raised and decided on appeal.  A mandate instructing a 
court to sentence a defendant to a given term––without permitting 
consideration of grounds for departure not previously raised, or 
reconsideration of old grounds on the basis of facts and circumstances not 
reflected in the record on appeal––would, arguably, violate this rule.  More 
to the point, it would seriously undermine the district court’s ability, which 
is co-extensive with its duty to do justice, to consider all facts and 
circumstances known to it at the time of its resentencing decision.
  On remand, the judge conducted fact finding into the 
effects on family stability of reincarcerating a defendant who had already 
been released, or lengthening the prison term of a defendant who was about 
to be released.  What he found convinced him that family circumstances 
departures were required. 
120
Seen this way, the mandate rule imposes constraints on the reviewing 
court as well as on the court below.
 
121
 
 118. Id. at 174. 
  A court of appeals that recognizes 
 119. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6; United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 120. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning 
the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of 
the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate 
sentence.”); United States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (arguing for broad 
discretion in obtaining and using information at sentencing).  But see Bernstein, supra note 
27, at 771 (arguing that the Guidelines, in conjunction with § 3661, have the effect of 
“prevent[ing] a judge from using all the information [he or] she acquires. This makes the 
judge’s job not easier, but harder”).  This freedom has been somewhat circumscribed by the 
Feeney Amendment.  See United States v. Kahn, 325 F. Supp. 2d 218 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(construing that amendment restrictively and discussing use of a jury to ameliorate harsh 
sentences in light of history and constitutional requirements). 
 121. The court of appeals, arguably, violated this rule in the Eastway Construction cases, 
when it required the district judge to impose monetary sanctions ten times larger than the 
district judge believed appropriate.  See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 
F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985) (reversing denial of sanctions), on remand, 637 F. Supp. 558 
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the duty of the district judge to consider all the facts and circumstances of 
the case will ensure that its mandates do not unnecessarily restrict the trial 
judge’s ability to utilize all relevant information. 
 
III. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES AS A PARADIGM OF 
JUDICIAL REACTION TO UNJUST LAWS 
 
Observing one long-time district judge at sentencing, a colleague wrote: 
“I am struck by how much he sought, within the range of discretion, to 
tailor the sentences of individual defendants to their particular crimes, 
needs and circumstances.”122  The Guidelines system and mandatory 
minimums which bind all federal courts have made such tailoring a much 
more difficult task.  The results have been widespread injustice.123  
“[F]ederal judges are almost unanimously opposed to mandatory 
minimums”124
Many judges first declared the Guidelines unconstitutional.
 and to overly harsh and rigid guidelines.  Their words and 
deeds in responding to the current sentencing regime reflect the range of 
options available to judges who feel the burden of unjust laws. 
125  They 
then attempted to show why, under the controlling statutory scheme, the 
Guidelines are not binding in cases in which they produce irrational 
results.126
 
(E.D.N.Y. 1986); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 
1987) (increasing sanctions from $1000 to $10,000 without explaining why the former 
constituted an abuse of discretion); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Chancellor’s Boot, 54 
BROOK. L. REV. 31, 31 (1988) (discussing district and appellate court opinions in Eastway).  
Rule 11 by itself made it clear that it was the district court, not the court of appeals, which 
was to decide the type of punishment to be imposed.  Were it not for the unwarranted 
insistence by the court of appeals on a monetary sanction, the court would have merely 
publicly admonished the attorney. 
  Next, constrained to work within the Guidelines system, they 
 122. Solomon Oliver, Jr., The Judge As Guardian: A Tribute to Judge Frank J. Battisti, 
42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 369, 369 (1994). 
 123. The literature on these injustices is overwhelming.  See, e.g., Barbara S. 
Meierhoefer, The Role of Offense and Offender Characteristics in Federal Sentencing, 66 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 367 (1992) (describing decrease in judicial discretion and increase in severity 
of sentencing under Guidelines).  See also American Bar Association’s program to reform 
criminal punishment in this country by reducing American reliance on incarceration, 
following the invitation of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 75 CRIM. L. REP. 549 (2004). 
 124. Jose A. Cabranes & Leonard Orland, Lessons from the Federal Courts Study 
Committee, 5 FED. SENTENCING REP. 203 (1993). 
 125. See Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What’s “Unconstitutional” 
About the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 186-87 (1991) (analyzing 
early responses to the Commission and its Guidelines). 
 126. See United States v. Abbadessa, 848 F. Supp. 369 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), vacated by 
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strove to achieve maximum room to maneuver, for example by expanding 
the departure power,127 into a variety of situations not considered by the 
Sentencing Commission in the formulation of the Guidelines.128  At the 
same time, they have criticized the Guidelines (and mandatory minimums) 
in opinions, often following them “with regret” while sending strong 
messages to the appellate courts.  In addition, they have made their 
objections known in a variety of other ways, from op-ed pages129 to 
Congressional committee hearings.130  Finally, through such organizations 
as the Judicial Conference, they urged the legislative branch to change the 
laws and the Sentencing Commission (on which several federal judges sit) 
to modify the Guidelines.131
These multi-pronged efforts have had an impact on all three branches of 
government.  While some federal courts of appeals have persisted in 
unnecessarily restricting lower-court decision-making,
 
132
 
United States v. DeRiggi, 45 F.3d 713 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Concepcion, 795 F. 
Supp. 1262 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 others, including 
 127. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (1994) (“[T]he sentencing court may impose a sentence outside 
the range established by the applicable guideline, if the court finds ‘that there exists an 
aggravating, or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission.’”). 
 128. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 885 F. Supp. 62 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying family 
circumstances departure applicable to defendant caring for members of extended family); 
United States v. Lopez-Aguilar, 886 F. Supp. 305 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying family 
circumstances departure when lengthy incarceration would prevent defendant from having 
children).  One sentencing judge, responding anonymously to a survey, described, with 
unflinching honesty, the effects of the Guidelines: “[T]he Guidelines . . . have made 
charlatans and dissemblers of us all.  We [judges] spend our time plotting and scheming, 
bending and twisting, distorting and ignoring the law in an effort to achieve a just result.”  
Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge’s Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 365 (1992) (emphasis in original). 
 129. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Drugs, Crime and Punishment: The War on Drugs is 
Self-Defeating, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1993, at A19. 
 130. See Sauer, supra note 50, at 1239 n.41 (cataloguing judicial criticism of mandatory 
sentencing schemes); see also Steve Y. Koh, Reestablishing the Federal Judge’s Role in 
Sentencing, 101 YALE L.J. 1109, 1125 (1992) (quoting Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2747 (1987) (statement of Judge Robert W. Sweet)). 
 131. Such lobbying may raise separation of powers problems.  See J. Clark Kelso, Time, 
Place, and Manner Restrictions on Extrajudicial Speech by Judges, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
851, 863 (1995) (suggesting, but not exploring, idea that such “involvement in legislative 
activities is inconsistent with the judiciary’s limited role in our constitutional structure”); 
Weinstein, Limits on Judges’ Learning, Speaking, and Acting, supra note 33, at 7 n.23 
(“When the judiciary speaks in an organized, official way, as through the Judicial 
Conference, complex issues of separation of powers are implicated.”). 
 132. See Steven L. Chanenson, Consistently Inconsistent: Circuit Rulings on the 
Guidelines in 1994, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 224 (1995); see generally JEFRI WOOD, 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, GUIDELINE SENTENCING: AN OUTLINE OF APPELLATE CASE LAW 
ON SELECTED ISSUES (2002), available at 
CHRISTENSENWIENSTEIN 2/3/2011  9:58 PM 
2004] LAY DOWN PROFESSIONAL LIFE  129 
the Second Circuit, have wisely permitted district judges a good deal of 
judicial discretion––an action a former Chief Judge of the Circuit has 
attributed to the legacy of Learned Hand.133  In the meantime, Congress has 
permitted judges to avoid imposing unduly harsh sentences in the case of 
minor first-time drug offenders.  This provision, dubbed the “safety valve,” 
was a direct response to the entreaties of district court judges.134  The 
attorney general initiated her own investigation of drug sentencing laws 
because of requests from federal judges.135  Even the Sentencing 
Commission sometimes has given indications of rethinking the unnecessary 
harshness of the Guidelines, including surprisingly candid analysis in 
reports to Congress.136
One subset of judges’ objections to current sentencing law involves 
criteria that are racially discriminatory in their effect.
 
137  The fine opinion 
of the district court in United States v. Clary,138
 
http://www.fjc.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsf/autoframe?openform&url_r=pages/556&url_l=inde
x (last visited Oct. 29, 2004). 
 as well as other judicial 
 133. In his essay Personal Reflections on Learned Hand and the Second Circuit, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 387 (1995), Judge James Oakes asserted that Learned Hand would have 
“vehemently disagreed” with the straitjacketing of judges by the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines.  Judge Oakes wrote: 
Hand was far too much a craftsman to countenance so rigid an intrusion on the 
discretion of a judge. “To him, the writing of an opinion was a work of creation, 
individual to every judge and unique to every case.” . . . He would not have 
agreed . . . that the quantity of drugs or money surrounding the circumstances of 
any given crime should determine the offender’s sentence.  Moreover, I think that 
Hand would find the guidelines rather appalling for their insistence that judges 
sentence each individual defendant without reference to their individuality . . . .  I 
cannot help but believe that the Second Circuit’s uniquely flexible approach to the 
guidelines [as shown by United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992)] is 
due in part to Learned Hand’s legacy of craftsmanship and care. 
Id. at 391-92. 
 134. See Letter from Congressman Don Edwards to Article III Judges, Aug. 30, 1994 (on 
file with author) (“Success in adoption of the safety valve was in large part due to the 
eloquent statements of federal judges who consistently described the unfair and inequitable 
results of mandatory minimum sentences.”).  Congress’s delegate, the Sentencing 
Commission, has also begun to contemplate ameliorative measures.  See, e.g., U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, Proposal to Reduce Importance of Drug Quantity as a Sentencing 
Factor (draft proposal Sept. 9, 1994) (on file with author). 
 135. See Labaton, supra note 22. 
 136. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Special Report to Congress: Cocaine and 
Federal Sentencing Policy (2002) [hereinafter USSC, Cocaine Sentencing]. 
 137. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (treating crack as “worth” 100 times as much as powder 
cocaine for sentencing purposes). 
 138. 846 F. Supp. 768, 774-82 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (examining role of racism in drug 
enforcement since late 17th century, particularly “unconscious racism” underlying disparate 
treatment of crack and its chemical equivalent, cocaine), rev’d, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(overruling but praising district court’s “painstakingly crafted opinion”).  The view set out 
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and academic views, prompted Congress to act.  In the Crime Bill enacted 
in September 1994, it directed the United States Sentencing Commission to 
study “the differences in penalty levels that apply to different forms of 
cocaine.”139  The resulting report recommended lower sentences for 
offenses involving crack.140
Thus, in the case of the Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory 
minima,
 
141 the effects of district judges’ words and deeds, while not all 
some judges have hoped for, have not been inconsequential.142
A retrograde tendency by Congress to limit discretion of the courts to 
ameliorate harsh Guidelines sentences has manifested itself.  Passage of the 
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of 
Children Today Act of 2003 (“PROTECT Act”) is illustrative of the 
legislature’s attempts to hinder the ability of federal judges to do their work 
properly by requiring the Court of Appeals to review de novo a District 
Court’s departure from the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range.
  Much more 
can and should be done by the courts to improve sentencing even under the 
Guidelines. 
143
 
by the trial court has also received considerable academic attention.  See, e.g., DAVID 
MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE 274 (1987) (describing racist motivations of drug 
substantive and sentencing law). 
  
Appellate judges gain de facto sentencing authority whenever a trial court 
 139. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 
280006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2097 (1994). 
 140. See USSC, Cocaine Sentencing, supra note 136, at 198 (concluding that the present 
100-1 ratio is too great). Congress refused to allow amelioration. 
 141. See Bernstein, supra note 27, at 768-70 (describing relationship between Guidelines 
and mandatory minimum systems). 
 142. The dialogue between the district courts and the courts of appeals concerns more 
than the substance of sentencing provisions, extending into “procedural” concerns that can 
have dramatic outcome-determinative effects.  For example, the appeals courts have 
generally held that a preponderance standard applies in determining facts that may result in 
many more years in prison.  Trial judges, a survey shows, apply a more sensible sliding 
scale that goes up to beyond-a-reasonable-doubt on critical sentencing issues.  See United 
States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (surveying judges), aff’d on other 
grounds, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979). 
  The practice of the trial courts, brought to the attention of the courts of appeals in a 
number of opinions, may be having some effect on the appellate court judges.  In the Second 
Circuit, the Chief Judge has stated that “a strong argument can be made that the ‘clear and 
convincing evidence’ standard should be used, at least for substantial enhancements [under 
the Guidelines].”  See United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 394 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(Newman, J., concurring).  Another panel of the same court has suggested that, at the very 
least, “there is a constitutional requirement of some rough proportionality between the 
weight of the evidence of . . . uncharged conduct and the degree of adjustment or departure 
[to which that evidence leads].”  United States v. Gigante, 39 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 143. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 670 (2003) (amending 18 
U.S.C 3742(e)). 
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provides a lower sentence than do the Guidelines matrices.  The courts 
reacted strongly against this legislative change.144
The Supreme Court has again signaled its concern with Guidelines and 
upward departures permitting sentences based on “facts” not found by 
juries.  In Blakely v. Washington, the Court found that enhancement of the 
length of a sentence under a state guideline based on findings of “fact” 
required, under the Federal Constitution, that the “facts” be either conceded 
or found by a jury.
 
145 The question remains open as to whether Blakely’s 
reasoning invalidates the Guidelines.146
 
 
IV.  THE DUTY OF A JUDGE TO SPEAK OUT AGAINST UNJUST 
LAWS 
A.  In judicial opinions 
A judge who cannot “underrule” can, at the very least, express 
reservations in a strongly-worded memorandum.  According to Judge 
Charles Wyzanski, such reservations 
promote[] the growth of the law in the court where it most counts.  For if 
the criticism of the precedent be just, the appellate court will set matters 
straight, and any trial judge worthy of his salt will feel complimented in 
 
 144. See, e.g., In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (ordering the video 
recording of all sentencing hearings); Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Attacks a Law 
Infringing on Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004, at A14; Carl Hulse, Bill to Create Alert 
System on Abduction is Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003, at A1 (quoting letter from 
Chief Judge Rehnquist to Senate Judiciary Committee stating that the Feeney amendment 
“would do serious harm to the basic structure of the sentencing guideline system and would 
seriously impair the ability of courts to impose just and reasonable sentences”); David M. 
Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime: The Congressional Assault on Judicial 
Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 211, 229-37 (2004) (criticizing Feeney Amendment 
in text accompanying notes 121-62). 
 145. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). 
 146. See, e.g., United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (D. Utah 2004) (reverting 
to pre-Guidelines procedure, the sentence was much the same as it would have been under 
the Guidelines); United States v. Green, Nos. CR. A. 02-10054-WGY, CR.A. 01-10469-
WGY & CR.A. 99-10066-WGY, 2004 WL 1381101 (D. Mass. June 18, 2004) (finding 
Guidelines are unconstitutional before Blakely, based on the pre-Blakely decision in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)); 
Alan Vinegrad and Jonathan Sack, Blakely: The End of the Sentencing Guidelines, N.Y.L.J., 
July 6, 2004, at 4 (“the entire federal guidelines scheme is on precarious constitutional 
grounds.”).  My current views are stated in United States v. Khan, 325 F. Supp. 2d 218 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (use of jury to ameliorate sentencing under guidelines).  The subject is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
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being reversed on a ground he himself suggested.147
In one instructive case, the Second Circuit responded to such an invitation 
to reverse.  After imposing a harsher sentence than he would have liked in a 
drug prosecution, Chief Judge Thomas Platt, according to the court of 
appeals, 
 
urged defense counsel to seek a reversal of his refusal to depart [under the 
Guidelines] . . . .  This explicit invitation for reversal from a jurist of long 
and distinguished service is a clear indication that Chief Judge Platt did 
not believe justice was served by the sentence he imposed.  [Given the 
possibility of departure], we remand this case and provide Chief Judge 
Platt the opportunity “to fulfill the traditional role of a district judge in 
bringing compassion and common sense to the sentencing process.”148
Even when there is little chance of winning vindication through reversal, a 
judge should have no qualms in candidly expressing views.  As Judge 
Shirley S. Abrahamson reminds us, 
 
The voice of a judge’s conscience can enable us to believe more ardently 
in the principle of the law.  Yet the judge’s passionate words and emotive 
sentences can also force us to question the fairness and humanity 
underlying our legal system.  Whether they serve to exalt or to challenge 
the law, words and sentences from the judge’s heart most assuredly serve 
justice.149
 
 147. Wyzanski, supra note 102, at 1299 (emphasis added). 
 
 148. United States v. Mickens, 977 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. 
Rogers, 972 F.2d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
 149. Shirley S. Abrahamson et al., Words and Sentences: Penalty Enhancement for Hate 
Crimes, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 515, 541-42 (1994).  In the course of evaluating her 
own dissent in State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W. 2d 807, 818 (Wis. 1992) (Abrahamson, J., 
dissenting), in which she expresses her personal views about the wisdom of a hate crimes 
law, Judge Abrahamson embarks on an evaluation of the role of personal expression in 
judicial opinions. She notes: 
[A]n appeal to the emotions has an ironic effect.  When a judge moves from 
personal statement to legal argument, the law rises above the fray of passions.  
The detachment of the legal analysis is enhanced.  The legal conclusion appears 
more reasonable, more authoritative, precisely because the judge has wrestled 
with, and overcome, the personal passions.  The overall effect is a heightened 
sense of objectivity that befits the weighty task at hand. 
Abrahamson et al., supra, at 531. 
  Judge Abrahamson notes, a “judge who voices personal views risks the reprobation 
of his colleagues.”  She cites Justice Scalia’s response to the dissenters in a death penalty 
case, Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).  The dissenters wrote that “[n]othing could 
be . . . more shocking to the conscience . . . than to execute a person who is actually 
innocent.”  Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia responded: “If the system 
that has been widely in place for 200 years (and remains widely approved) ‘shocks’ the 
dissenters’ consciences, . . . perhaps they should doubt the calibration of their consciences, 
or, better still, the usefulness of ‘conscience-shocking’ as a legal test.”  Id. at 428 (Scalia, J., 
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In using judicial opinions to express opposition to controlling caselaw, 
appellate judges have the option not available to district judges to file a 
dissenting or concurring opinion, thereby preserving those arguments that 
do not prevail.  As Chief Justice Hughes observed, “a dissent in a court of 
last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence 
of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into 
which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed.”150
Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has addressed the purposes 
and effects of dissents at the appellate level,
 
Institutions such as the New York Law Revision Commission, established 
on the suggestion of Judge Cardozo, exist to listen to courts’ dissatisfaction 
with the law so that corrective legislation can be drafted. 
151 comparing the United 
States’ judicial system to that of Britain (in which justices announce 
opinions seriatim152) and of continental Europe (where anonymous 
decisions represent “the court”).  She concluded that ours was a middle 
path; opinions represent the institution, with occasional concurrences and 
dissents appended to remind the various audiences of the court’s human 
components.153  Justice Ginsburg suggested that too many dissents have the 
effect of undermining public confidence in the legal system and that in 
some situations––notably in capital cases––they may be unfair to the losing 
party.154
There is no question that a unanimous opinion carries more weight than 
the holding of a divided court.  This explains why Chief Justice Warren 
strove to obtain a unanimous court for his opinion in Brown.
 
155  Yet 
dissents also have a respected position in our system; many embody what 
later become majority views.156
 
concurring). 
 
 150. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1936). 
 151. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133 
(1990); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1185 (1992) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Speaking]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Styles of Collegial 
Judging, 39 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 199 (1992). 
 152. Ginsburg, Speaking, supra note 151, at 1189 (citing LOUIS BLOM-COOPER & GAVIN 
DREWRY, FINAL APPEAL: A STUDY OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS IN ITS JUDICIAL CAPACITY 81-82 
(1972)). 
 153. In civil law countries, a judge’s decision does not carry the precedential weight of 
stare decisis.  The anonymity and concise nature of these opinions leave little room for 
debate.  Conversely, in common-law countries, a judge must write under his own name, 
risking his reputation on the outcome. 
 154. Id. at 1191. 
 155. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 156. See, for example, Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 
(1896). 
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In fact, it is possible that, contrary to Justice Ginsburg’s view, dissents 
increase public respect for judicial institutions.  Judge Stanley Fuld of the 
New York Court of Appeals, one of the all-time great common law judges, 
characterized the role of the dissent as an “antidote for judicial lethargy,” 
an assurance that the bench does not merely rubber stamp the opinion of 
one member.157  The dissent can also serve as a spur to legislators, or as a 
precursor for en banc review by a circuit court or for the grant of certiorari 
by the Supreme Court.  The dissent helps to clarify the issues on appeal and 
may serve as a “blueprint for a new majority opinion.”158
It is not necessary to write separately, however, to express disagreement 
with controlling case law.  For example, one Ninth Circuit judge, writing 
for a unanimous panel, expressed regret at having to follow a Supreme 
Court decision that appeared to require an unjust result.
 
159  This type of 
expression is analogous to the protests typically undertaken by district 
court judges.  At the district level, cases are heard by only one judge, so 
there can be no dissenting or concurring view––in the formal sense––
within a single memorandum.  This does not, however, prevent the trial 
judge from criticizing controlling caselaw160 or from fully describing more 
persuasive principles he or she does not feel free to follow.161  Judges 
should recognize that there is no danger, even of reversal, in doing so; 
“only judicial deeds––not judicial words––may constitute legal error.”162
In fact, a well-balanced opinion, on an issue important to the trial judge, 
 
 
 157. See Stanley H. Fuld, The Voices of Dissent, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 927 (1962). 
 158. Frank X. Altimari, The Practice of Dissenting in the Second Circuit, 59 BROOK. L. 
REV. 275, 279 (1993). 
 159. See United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1992) (criticizing 
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (prosecutors have no duty to present 
substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand jury)). The same Supreme Court decision has 
provoked a number of other critical opinions.  See, e.g., United States v. Orjuela, 809 F. 
Supp. 193, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[R]egrettably, [Williams] compels the conclusion that 
this court lacks power to remedy the government’s apparent abuse of its power.”); see 
generally Fred A. Bernstein, Behind the Gray Door: Williams, Secrecy, and the Federal 
Grand Jury, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563 (1994) (criticizing Williams as unjust and inconsistent 
with practice in many districts). 
 160. See, e.g., United States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (criticizing 
Second Circuit rule of automatic obstruction of justice enhancement under section 3C1.1 of 
the sentencing Guidelines, but imposing enhancement in light of court of appeals mandate); 
United States v. Tropiano, 898 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (following court of appeals 
mandate despite grave doubt that it reflected either wise policy or the current view of the 
Supreme Court). 
 161. See, e.g., United States v. Ekwunoh, 888 F. Supp. 369 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (describing 
importance of considering mens rea in drug sentencing, despite court of appeals’ instruction 
to disregard defendant’s reasonable belief); cf. Jack B. Weinstein & Fred A. Bernstein, The 
Denigration of Mens Rea in Drug Sentencing, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 121 (1994). 
 162. Cook v. Hirschberg, 258 F.2d 56, 57 (2d Cir. 1958). 
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will invariably contain opposing views.  A trial judge, like an appellate 
dissenter or even an appellate regretter, has an obligation to move the law 
in a direction believed to be compelled by moral and ethical principles and 
by underlying precepts of law.  A judge who must follow unjust caselaw 
need not suffer in silence.163
B.  Through out-of-court speech 
 
In our democracy, the people have a right to be informed when there is 
as much hypocrisy and sacrifice of lives and money as there is in our 
sentencing and drug laws.164  In the case of sentencing, silent acquiescence 
by individual judges would have sacrificed significant constitutional 
values, as well as individual defendants, to a rigid regulatory scheme.165
A decision must be made by each individual judge on the basis of both 
law and conscience.  Too much civil disobedience by jurors, citizens, or 
judges can result in destructive anarchy,
  
Judges who see the system in operation have an obligation to advise the 
public of the facts as they observe them.  A judge who believes he or she is 
called upon to commit an immoral act should make that view known, and 
the judge’s colleagues should respect his or her decision to “go public.” 
166 but some flexibility in 
recognizing differences in moral views is essential in a free republic.167
 
 163. Cf. GUNTHER, supra note 109, at 149 (noting that “bowing to precedent did not 
prevent [Learned Hand] from expressing sharp and thoughtful criticism of the prevailing 
law, or from suggesting a better approach”); Murakami et al., supra note 35 (noting that, 
before leaving office, Justice Utter wrote powerful dissents in many death penalty cases, 
some of which were later used by federal courts to overturn convictions); see generally 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Is it the Siren’s Call?  Judges and Free Speech While Cases are 
Pending, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 831, 844 (1995) (“[J]udicial speech, even about pending 
cases, should be regarded as constitutionally protected unless the government can prove that 
the speech posed a substantially likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicatory 
proceeding, or at the very least, prove that the statement might reasonably be expected to 
affect its outcome or impair its fairness.”); Weinstein, Limits on Judges’ Learning, 
Speaking, and Acting, supra note 33. 
 A 
 164. The inequities of the drug laws, which are myriad, are beyond the scope of this 
paper.  They are catalogued elsewhere.  See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, An Analysis of Non-
Violent Drug Offenders with Minimal Criminal Histories (1994).  The government-
sponsored study found that federal prisons are “packed with ‘low-level’ drug law violators”; 
two-thirds of them received long mandatory minimum sentences even though a short prison 
term would have been an equally effective deterrent. 
 165. See Jack B. Weinstein, Comments on Jury Nullification: Proceedings of the Fifty-
Third Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 145 F.R.D. 149, 170 (1993) 
(Panel Discussion—Jury Nullification) (commenting that “trial Judges are, I suppose, 
nullifying the guidelines”) [hereinafter Weinstein, Jury Nullification]. 
 166. See, e.g., Kaimipono David Wenger & David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries, 
2003 WIS. L. REV. 1115 (citations omitted). 
 167. Actions of judges may be seen as analogous to jury nullification.  See Alan Scheflin 
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system as robust as ours has a good deal of play in its joints. 
In a number of instances in which judges have spoken out about matters 
of which they had special knowledge, their efforts have been effective in 
eliciting ameliorative action.  For example, the view that courts of appeals 
could tell a trial court that a particular judge should not preside over a case 
on remand has created intercourt tensions.  In the Eastern District of New 
York, trial judges agreed that this practice was ill-advised.  The trial judges 
explained their position to the appellate courts through direct conversations 
with appellate judges, the promulgation of court rules, and an article in 
Federal Rules Decisions.168
 That judges are permitted to make their views known was, I thought, 
a settled question. Nevertheless, one Ninth Circuit judge admonished two 
of his colleagues for publicly criticizing the actions of the Supreme Court.  
The criticism grew out of the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear an  eleventh-
hour petition in the capital case of Robert Alton Harris.
  This open communication enabled the trial 
courts to moderate the earlier appellate practice, which now generally 
conforms to the district court’s view. 
169  In the view of 
some judges, that refusal required California to proceed with Harris’ 
execution before appropriate legal remedies had been fully considered.  A 
Ninth Circuit judge had written an article for the New York Times arguing 
that the decision forced lower court judges to commit “treason to the 
constitution.” 170
 
& John Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 51, 88 (1980) (“Jury nullification, rather than destroying the law, is necessary to 
protect it.”); Weinstein, Considering Jury “Nullification”, supra note 32, at 243-45 (“The 
exercise of the nullification power does not cast doubt on the jury process; rather, it 
reaffirms the liberty of a free society upon which it is based.”); Weinstein, Jury Nullification 
supra note 165, at 168-72; see also Gail Dance Cox, Jurors Rise Up Over Principle and 
Their Perks, NAT’L L. J., May 29, 1995, at A1 (describing hints of a juror revolt); Sauer, 
supra note 50, at 1254-60 (describing jury nullification as an important check on 
governmental power).  But see Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 930 (9th Cir. 1992) (Trott, J., 
concurring) (calling jury nullification “illegitimate” power); Robert G. Morvillo, Jury 
Nullification, N.Y.L.J., June 7, 1994, at 3 (“The strength and consistency of the view that 
jurors [should] be kept in the dark about their ultimate power is remarkable [given] . . . the 
historical foundations of [the] jury power and the near unanimous recognition that the jury 
should continue to possess this power.”). 
  A second Ninth Circuit judge gave a speech, later 
published in the Yale Law Journal, in which he called the Harris matter 
“the logical culmination of a series of Supreme Court decisions 
subordinating individual liberties to the less-than-compelling interests of 
the state and stripping lower federal courts of the ability to protect 
 168. See generally Weinstein, supra note 78. 
 169. See Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 503 U.S. 653 (1992). 
 170. John T. Noonan, Should State Executions Run on Schedule?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 
1992, at A17. 
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individual rights.” 171 
 Responding in a law review forum, Judge Arthur Alarcon wrote that he 
was “astonished by this public . . . criticism of contemporary decisions of 
the Supreme Court [which] I had thought . . . was clearly contrary to 
elementary principles of ethical judicial conduct.”172
It is my view that public, off-the-bench criticism of the decisions of the 
Supreme Court is prohibited by existing ethical rules.  If it is not, then 
rules should be adopted to make it clear that such conduct will not be 
tolerated because of the threat it would pose to the rule of law if other 
lower court judges were to publicly attack decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court. 
  Judge Alarcon wrote: 
173
Judge Reinhardt––the author of the Yale Law Journal article––
responded that “judges should speak forthrightly about the role of the 
courts in American society, about the relationship between law and justice, 
about the true meaning of the Constitution and some of its principal 
provisions, and about our own personal visions of justice and judging.”  
And, Judge Reinhardt added, “[w]e should do so in specific as well as 
general terms.” 
 
174
I share that view.  Judges have a duty, given their unique vantage point, 
intimate knowledge of the system and––in the federal realm––the 
invaluable protection of life tenure, to expose injustice where they can.  
Moderation in this, as in other matters, is desirable.  Respectful 
disagreement when the judge deems it appropriate. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For a judge who declines to participate passively in injustice, every day 
is a good day to “die.”   
 In Nazi Germany, jurists continued their “law abiding” careers, using 
legal instruments to segregate and direct the destruction of their fellow-
citizens.  One may ask, had the German judiciary stood up for the right, 
 
 171. Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, the Death Penalty, and the Harris Case, 
102 YALE L. J. 205 (1992). 
 172. Arthur Alarcon, Judicial Speech: Off-the-Bench Criticism of Supreme Court 
Decisions by Judges Fosters Disrespect for the Rule of Law and Politicizes Our System of 
Justice, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 795, 798 (1995). 
 173. Id. at 798-99.  The irony is that Judge Alarcon had to resort to publicly criticizing 
his colleagues to make these views known. 
 174. Stephen Reinhardt, Judicial Speech and the Open Judiciary, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV 
805, 806 (1995); see also J. Clark Kelso, supra note 131, at 851 (defending speeches like 
Judge Reinhardt’s following a reasonable post-litigation “cooling-off period”); George M. 
Kraw, Beyond Published Opinions, RECORDER, Aug. 11, 1993, at 10-11 (defending Judge 
Reinhardt’s public statements on the Harris execution). 
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might the Holocaust and even the Second World War have been avoided? 
 By contrast, in Brown, the United States Supreme Court rejected––
though belatedly––a racist precedent that legally walled off black 
Americans from the society of whites.  One may ask, had the Supreme 
Court stood for the right before the Civil War, might that war have been 
avoided?  Continued implementation of the principles established in Brown 
has become an economic and social necessity.175  America will not be able 
to compete internationally unless everyone enjoys the benefits of a good 
education, and the cross-racial understanding indispensable to success in 
global marketplace.  In this instance, as in many others, morality and social 
practicality lead to much the same result.  Acquiescence in injustice is a 
danger to the spirit as well as our physical well-being.   
 In daily sentencing, when we knowingly create injustice, tarnishing our 
country’s reputation for a compassionate rule of law, are we laying up a 
moral debt that will be paid in unforeseen ways?176
 
 
 
 175. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003) (“In order to cultivate a set 
of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to 
leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and 
ethnicity.”). 
 176. See Anthony Lewis, Making Torture Legal, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, June 17, 2004, at 
4 (“A committed prosecutor would do what investigators of official crimes have done since 
Nuremberg: apply the principle of command responsibility and work his way up the chain to 
the source of misconduct. . . . [T]here is no other visible way for America to recover its 
good name—and its moral sense of self.”); Eric Schmitt, Abuses at Prison Tied to Officers 
in Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004, at A1; see also Jack B. Weinstein, When Judges 
Are Asked to Do Evil, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 28, 2004, at 2. 
